

though he is not clearly conscious of the moral principles involved in them. In such cases, he is guided by moral ideas which are unreflective. When he reflects upon morality, clearly defines an end consciously strives for the achievement of it, he is guided by ideas about morality. People are first guided by moral ideas imbibed from the society. Then they reflect upon them and are guided by the moral principles involved in them. First they are guided by moral ideas. Then they are guided by ideas about morality. Even moral idea can be analysed by the intellect and turned into an idea about morality, which is called by Mackenzie an 'ethical idea'. Every ethical idea becomes a source of moral ideas.

Thus there is a gradual development of morality from group morality to personal morality. The moral life of a person develops from customary action, founded on suggestion and imitation, to the stage of personal morality based on reflection.

CUSTOM AS THE STANDARD OF GROUP MORALITY

In early group life custom is the standard of morality. Custom consists in group ways of acting. Customary conduct is largely instinctive and unconscious imitation of others' behaviour. But it is partly reflective. The members of a group behave according to custom which is approved by the group. The ways of behaviour approved by the group and habitually followed by its members are handed down from generation to generation. They are not only habits of the people, but also approved by the group. They embody the moral judgment of the group. They are directed towards the welfare of the people. If any one violates them, he is punished by the group.

Custodians of Customs. The old men, the old women, the priests and the chiefs are the custodians of these customs. They train the young to observe them and punish those who violate them. They modify details of customary observances or add new customs. But the group as a whole, including living as well as dead members and the kindred ancestral gods, is the custodian of customs. Thus customs acquire superhuman authority.

Folk Ways. At the level of custom an action is considered to be right if it has always been done, and an action is considered to be wrong if it is not always done. Folkways constitute custom. Gregarious or herd instinct and the innate tendencies of sympathy, imitativeness and suggestibility are the basis of customary morality. Group ways of action are instinctively followed by the members of the group. Suggestion and imitation work in the individuals. They are motivated by common sympathy and resentment, and fear of punishment by the group if folkways are infringed. They are not guided by conscious reflection on the moral principles underlying the customs.

Origin of Customs. The origin of customs is to be sought in several factors. First, every member of a group is intimately connected with other members of the group and with the group as a whole. They have to act on the principle of give and take. In a family, father, mother and children have their

special parts in earning livelihood. They have their rights and duties. When the group goes fishing or hunting, every man has his place and part. He has a right to the fruit of his labour. He has a duty to do his part well. A man makes a gift to his chief and gets some favour in return. A man gives a present to another, and he expects some present in return. These group ways of acting, which become regular and fixed are turned into customs.

Group Ways of Action. Secondly, some group ways of action succeed, and others fail. Men connect successful actions with good luck, and unsuccessful actions with bad luck. They approve the former and condemn the latter. Successful ways are approved and repeated, and turned into customs. Unsuccessful ways are condemned and discarded. The former are regarded as lucky, while the latter are regarded as unlucky. Both good and bad luck are ascribed to the unseen powers. They are not ascribed to mere chance. The conception of group welfare makes individual conformity a matter of group concern at this stage.

Individual Reaction. Thirdly, individuals react to certain ways of acting immediately. They applaud an act of daring, where useful or not. Thus individual opinions about certain actions mould custom. Individual opinions and social tradition both give rise to custom.

Means of Enforcing customs. Dewey and Tufts mention the following means of enforcing customs:

1. public approval and disapproval, praise of some actions and blame of others. The Public praise is emphasized by songs, dance, decorations, and the like. The Public contempt is expressed in ridicule calumny, boycott, excommunication and the like.

2. Taboos are not a means of enforcing customs. But they are themselves customs invested with peculiar sanctity. They ban any contact with certain persons or objects under penalty of danger from unseen powers. Any events connected with birth and death supposed to be due to the activity of spirits are sanctified by taboos. A new-born baby should not be touched. A dead body should not be touched. A priest, a deity, or an altar should not be touched. The taboos are based on dread of the unseen powers.

3. But sometimes they are used with conscious purpose. In order to have adequate supply of ripe coconuts the headmen may place taboo upon green coconuts to prevent them from being consumed before they are quite ripe. Taboo is a powerful agency to compel respect for the authority of the group.

4. **Ritual.** Ritual is a means of enforcing customs. Taboo is the great native guardian of customs. It prohibits certain actions. Ritual is the great positive agent. It helps the members of group from certain habits. They perform a certain act or ritual in association with one another, unconsciously and consciously imitating one another, and sharing the emotions of one another. They are aided in this corporate action by the charm of music, orderly procession, rhythm of movement, and the awe of mystery, which contribute

to stamp in the meaning and value of the action. Public praise encourages an action. Public condemnation inhibits an action. Taboo prohibits an action under penalty of danger from unseen powers. Ritual secures the actual performance of an action and gives a value to it.

5. Physical Force. Physical force is the surest means of enforcing customs. When neither group opinion, nor taboo, nor ritual secures conformity, physical force ensures it. The chiefs are strong men whose commands must be obeyed. The individual who dares violate a custom is coerced by the chief or the elders into submission. But physical coercion is not the rule but the exception. In primitive groups the majority support the authority of the group. Where there is a clash among different clans, the blood feud is the accepted method of enforcing custom. Thus public approval, taboo, ritual, and physical force are the means of enforcing customs.

Merits of Customary Morality. Customary morality has merits as well as defects. Customs furnish the germs of morality. They embody vague conceptions of 'right', 'good' and 'virtue'. Insofar as they are based on the recognition of mutual interdependence of the members of a group, they are setting standards of 'right' behaviour. Insofar as they are based on rational conceptions of group welfare, they are pointing out what should be regarded as 'good'. Insofar as they furnish approvals and disapproval by the group, they are laying the foundation of the conception of 'virtue'. Customary morality fosters sympathy and co-operation, encourages concerted action, and discourages selfishness and isolation. It makes for peace and harmony, strength and solidarity, fellowship and security.

Defects of Customary Morality. But customary morality is not without defects. The moral standards of custom are only partly rational. Many customs are irrational; some are injurious. Customs are partly rational; they contribute to the welfare of the group. They are partly irrational; they emphasize the inessential and ignore the essential. But morality requires men to estimate the value of acts correctly. It requires them to distinguish the essential from the inessential, the spirit from the letter. It gradually liberates men from the burden of trivial customary observances, and helps them form habits of obedience to the moral principles underlying them. Moreover, customs come into conflict with one another. Old customs are discarded because they become obsolete and useless; new customs are formed because they are supposed to have social utility. Some customs are thought to be injurious to the group by certain individuals wielding authority. They are looked upon with disfavour and gradually given up. Thus customary morality cannot satisfy the demands of human nature for a long time. It inevitably and imperceptibly gives the way to reflective and personal morality.

Use of Motives. Customary morality makes use of two main motives, fear in avoiding taboos and resentment in blood feuds. This fear is rooted in ignorance, and resentment is opposed to fellow-feeling which ought to prevail between man and man. Resentment in the primitive groups is sympathetic

resentment. An individual feels resentment in sympathy with the group. Besides fear and resentment, filial and parental affection, love of husband and wife, respect for the aged, and loyalty to fellow chessman are fostered by the primitive group. But reverence for duty or respect for the Moral Law can never be the motive of customary morality. It requires a growth in individuality, a power of reflection, and a definite conception of the supreme Good. Individuality grows out of conflicts and collisions between authority and liberty.

Customary morality encourages the formation of habits among the members of a group, which contribute to their good. It enforces the habits by threats of punishment, and thus holds up the average man. But it discourages freedom of action, and thus holds back the moral reformer who might forge ahead.

CUSTOMARY MORALITY AND REFLECTIVE PERSONAL MORALITY

Group morality is customary morality. It sets up custom as the standard of morality. Customary morality is corporate rather than personal. It does not involve conscious choice and rational conception of the good on the part of the individual, though it involves some vague notion of group welfare and public approval and disapproval of certain acts. Customary morality is not personal morality. It does not involve the individual's conscious pursuit of the good as the personal good. It depends upon habit and unconscious or conscious imitation. It depends upon social pressure to maintain social order. It does not allow the individual's initiative and personal moral progress. It inhibits reflective and personal morality. It is unreflective group morality.

Moral Progress. Moral progress inevitably demands transition from group morality to personal morality. It demands transition from unreflective morality to reflective morality. In moral advance (i) some rational method of formulating standards of moral evaluation takes the place of habitual and passive acceptance of custom; (ii) voluntary and personal choice and interest take the place of habitual response to group needs; and (iii) the worth and happiness of the person is recognized as an important constituent of the group welfare. Moral advance presupposes two collision: (i) the collision between group welfare and private interests of the individual, and (ii) the collision between order and progress, habit and critical reflection.

Rooted in human nature. The social and the individual both are rooted in human nature. The individual unconsciously identifies himself with the group, shares in the common emotions, and acts in habitual obedience to custom. And yet he has self-assertive impulses and desires, and revolts against the group and asserts his independence. Thus collision between the group authority and the individual's independence, and the collision between social order and the individual's progress bring about profound changes in morality and prepare the way for reflective personal morality.

The transition from group morality to personal morality is promoted by certain sociological agencies and psychological agencies. The sociological agencies are the following :

1. Economic forces. Economic forces brought about a disruption of the group or joint family among many peoples. The clan flourished in primitive times so long as it adopted hunting and simple agriculture as avocations. But with the advance of agriculture and the introduction of industry and commerce the joint family broke up and a certain amount of individualism appeared, because the advantage for the individual lay in private ownership. The farmer had to work hard and would not share the fruits of his labour with the lazy. Industry called forth intelligence and promoted skill. The intelligent and the skilful would not share the fruits of their special skill with the dull and the unskilled. Commerce also demanded and promoted individual shrewdness. The shrewd would not share the fruits of their keen insight with the unbusiness-like. In this way the individual revolted against the group and asserted his rights.

2. Progress of science and arts. The progress of science and arts tends to disintegrate group morality and make for personal morality. The customs of one people conflict with those of another people. Hence rational persons think of the reasons underlying the differences. They find the essential factors from the accidental factors and seek to eliminate the latter. They condemn and discard many taboos and rituals because of their increasing knowledge of the causes of natural events, such as disease and death, rich harvest and failure of crops, hurricanes and flood. The progress of science increases knowledge and introduces rationality into morality.

3. Industrial Arts. Various industrial and fine arts also tend to disintegrate group morality and promote personal morality. They flourish with great division of labour. They thrive on individual workmanship. Craftsmen and artists develop greater and greater individuality as they go on acquiring greater and greater skill in their crafts and arts. They are not satisfied with the evaluation of the group. They set up their own standards of evaluation. They want their own good in their own way. Thus arts and crafts make for personal morality.

4. Struggle. The kinship group has to fight with rival group. It must have a higher organization in order to fight successfully. Organization implies authority. A strong leader asserts his authority and compels obedience of the group. He gets an opportunity to assert himself in war. Very often the tyrant uses the whole machinery of society for his own advantage. Still his centralized authority breaks custom and group unity for all. Thus centralized authority of a king or a tyrant makes for personal morality.

5. New Religion. A new religion also disintegrates group morality and contributes to personal morality. Religion is closely bound up with morality. New religion brings in new conception of morality. Judaism emphasized outward conformity to external law, Christianity emphasizes purity of inner

motives and intentions. The collision between old and new compels people to think for themselves the merits and defects of both. Conflicts among religions lead to reflection on their claims. Thus religion is a portent force in introducing personal morality.

6. **Psychological agencies.** The psychological agencies in the transit on from group morality to personal morality are the following four tendencies towards self-assertion.....

(i) **Sex instinct.** The sex instinct brings the sexes together and lays the foundation of the family. The sex is a great socializing agency. Yet it constantly revolts against the restrictions put upon it by the social group. The individual asserts himself and chooses his helpmate according to his desire. The sex instinct sometimes revolts against social, legal and religious sanctions. Thus it is an individualizing agency.

(ii) **Private property.** Desire for private property breaks group morality and introduces personal morality. In the hunting stage, big games were hunted by the group and shared alike by the members: small games were hunted by individuals and belonged to them. In the early agricultural stage, the land was cultivated by the group, and the crops were shared alike by the group. But with the advance of agriculture, the industrious and provident did not like to share the fruits and their labour with the lazy and improvident. With the growth of industry and commerce, the individuals acquired special skill and workmanship and power of bargaining and did not like to share the fruits of their industry with the unskilled and unwise. In this way private property became an established institution.

(iii) **Strong leaders.** Struggles for liberty and mastery throw out strong individuals. They assert their views, impose them on their followers, and compel them to act upon their directions for their welfare. These struggles may be for economic freedom or intellectual liberty—freedom of thought and speech. They undermine authority of the group and foster personal reflection and intellectual criticism of group standards. Thus they promote rationalism and individualism.


(iv) **Desire for Honour.** Desire for honour and social esteem promotes the development of the individual. He think of his motives and action, and tries to live an honest and upright life. He forms for himself an ideal standard. He seeks public approval and admiration. Thus desire for social recognition is a potent factor in promoting personal morality.

Thus the sociological agencies such as economic forces, progress of science and arts, higher organization under central authority a new departure in religion, and the psychological agencies, such as the sex impulse, the desire for private property struggle for mastery or liberty, and the desire for social esteem break group morality and introduce personal morality.

Transition from Custom to Conscience. Custom is the standard of group morality. Custom conflicts with custom. So reflection begins, and separates the essential from the inessential elements. Sometimes essential

customs are enforced as positive laws. Individuals are compelled to obey these external laws. But laws also conflict with one another. These conflicts force the individual to reflect on the fundamental moral principles underlying the conflicting external laws. Gradually the individual deduces the moral principle from one supreme Moral Law of Conscience and regards it as the standard of morality. Thus the individual passes from group morality to personal morality, from custom to conscience, from external view of morality to internal view of morality.

Moral Authority Outside. At the level of customary morality the moral authority is outside the individual; it is the authority of the group. But at the level of personal morality the moral authority is inside the individual; it is the authority of conscience within him. At first, the inner voice of his conscience is an echo of public opinion of the group. But latter with the growth of the power of reflection the deliverance of his conscience contradicts the commands of the group. Customary morality if unreflective, while personal morality is reflective. In the former the individual uncritically accepts the command of the group embodied in group ways or custom, while in the latter he reflects upon the moral principles, and acts upon them, and asserts his own opinions and believes against the standards of the group. In personal morality the individual asserts the authority of his conscience against that of the group, and regards his moral life as his own personal matter. His political and social behaviour is governed by the political and social laws. But his moral behaviour is governed by the moral principles directed by his conscience. ◆



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rigour and vigilance.

Friendship to all. The moral aspirants should mediate on goodwill or friendship for all living beings, compassion for distressed creatures, delight at the sight of virtuous persons, and indifference to vicious persons. The *Gita*, Buddhism, and the Yoga system also enjoin cultivation of love, compassion, joy, and indifference. Jainism, like Buddhism, requires the aspirants to meditate on the transitoriness of the world and life, impurity, unsubstantiality, transitoriness, and painfulness of the body. It requires them to mediate on the fact that sins are destructive of welfare and liberation. (3) Jainism enjoins three kinds of restraint (*gupti*): (i) restraint of the body, (ii) restraint of speech, and (iii) restraint of mind. Restraints mean control of the natural functions. They are conducive to the purification of the self.

Forgiveness. Jainism inculcates the cultivation of the virtues of excellent forgiveness, excellent humility, excellent straight-forwardness, excellent purity, excellent truthfulness, excellent restraint, excellent austerities, excellent indifference and excellent celibacy. These are the observances (*dharma*). (5) Jainism regards perfection or self-realization as the highest good. The self has infinite knowledge, infinite bliss, and infinite power. Purity consists in the existence of the self in its innate nature. Asceticism or passionlessness is the means to the realization of perfection which consists in the extirpation of passions. Perfection is attained by the complete cessation of activities of body, speech, and mind, which disturb the tranquility of the soul. Ahimsa is the fundamental virtue. Truthfulness, non-stealing, sex-restraint, and non-covetousness, are based upon ahimsa. Thus the Jaina ethics is pre-eminently ethics of ahimsa.

MORAL VIRTUES

Q. 2. What are moral virtues? Compare western concepts with Indian.

Or

Define virtue. Examine the value of virtue on society.

Ans. Virtue is the habit of doing moral good. It is also the habit of abstaining from doing moral evil. In this way virtue is an indication of good character. According to Aristotle, "Virtue is a permanent state of mind, formed with the concurrence of the will and based upon an ideal of what is best in actual life, an ideal fixed by reason." In this way, virtue is an acquired quality. It is an acquired disposition, the quality of obeying moral law. The nature of virtue will become even more evident from an analysis of the relations it bears to duty, character, habit and value.

Virtue and Duty. Virtue is created by the habit of fulfilling duty. A person given to uninterrupted fulfilment of duty has a sterling character and the virtue of duty fulfilment. Thus the fulfilment of duty is intimately related to virtue but the difference between duty and virtue should not be forgotten on this account. Duty implies external activity and is a part of conduct. Virtue

implies internal excellence, being a quality of character. In brief, duty is the external manifestation of virtue, the latter being the internal aspect of duty. The existence of one proves the existence of the other.

Virtue and Character. It is evident from the above exposition that virtue and character are intimately related. Virtue indicates good character as vice is a sign of bad character. Virtue is the superiority of character, vice its defect. A virtuous person endeavours for the development and manifestation of the complete self and controls the baser passions. A person in vice is the slave of base passions and he does not distinguish between moral and immoral. Thus, virtue is as such a quality of character as vice is its defect.

Virtue and Habit. Moral activities flow from virtue but if an individual has done some good activity he cannot be called virtuous on the strength of it. Actually virtue is the habit of doing work. In the words of Aristotle, virtue is "a state apt to exercise deliberate choice being in the relative mean, determined by reason and as the man of practical wisdom would determine it." The morality of an action depends upon the goodness of its will. The habit of such good volition is virtue.

Virtue is the adoption of Golden men. Aristotle treats virtue as the habit of choosing the mean or middle path. According to him, a prudent act is moral. Excess is invariably bad. Intelligent people always adopt the golden mean in respect of any and everything. This habit in choice is virtue. In this way, the virtuous person adopts the middle path in personal as well as social conduct. For example, he is neither a coward nor a rash man who invites dangers, he is instead brave and enterprising. He neither runs from difficulties nor wilfully creates them but faces them adamantly. In this way, virtuous person is neither extravagant nor stringent. He is liberal and he also conducts himself in a manner befitting his nature. This mean is right for everyone but mean for everyone will be different proportionately to his capability. For example, bravery on the part of soldier may be mischief for an ordinary citizen.

In a general way, Aristotle's theory is a supremely practical theory but it cannot be applied in all circumstances. Muirhead has said quite correctly. "Moderation in all things may be as much of a vice as immoderation in one and all."

Virtue is Knowledge. Virtue is knowledge, at least for Socrates it is so. This statement means that most immoral activities are the result of ignorance. If some person possesses the knowledge of good he will not stoop to evil doings. This it is as natural for a good work to take shape when there is knowledge as it is for it to take shape when there is virtue. Thus knowledge is actually virtue. Ignorance is vice. No person consciously commits crimes. At the base of every bad work there is some ignorance. Plato, too, has supported the opinion of Socrates. And many Indian thinkers have presented similar opinions.

Virtue is also Habit. But, in actual fact a man cannot be virtuous by mere knowledge as long as he is not in the habit of performing good activities.

and habit does not necessarily result from mere knowledge. Here, some people can say that if some person indulges in immoral deed even while understanding good then it means that some part of his personality is still ignorant. But the use of such language is an indication of the ignorance of human psychology. Besides the power of comprehension man has affective and volitional aspects too. This volitional aspect is often beyond the control of man's intellectual aspect. One has to inculcate the habit of controlling it. Thus habit is virtue. Knowledge is not action without which there can be no question of morality. Thus, it is necessary for virtue that knowledge be converted in action. Accordingly, Mackenzie was correct in asserting that, "Virtue is a kind of knowledge as well as a kind of habit." Actually, ethics implies that a man capable of both good and bad, and is responsible for both. The belief that bad activities originate in ignorance is to relieve man of his responsibility in respect of them. Thus Socratic opinion is partially true.

Virtue and Happiness. Some ethical philosophers have treated happiness as invariably conjoined to virtue. Happiness is a state of harmony of reason and sentience. Integral self realisation produces happiness. In this way, a virtuous person gets happiness inevitably. He finds happiness in doing good work and abstains from bad work. Thus a life of virtue is a life of happiness. Aristotle has unflinchingly supported this opinion. According to him happiness is the result of a proper use of reason. Thus, a rational person is always happy. It should be noted here that virtue itself is not happiness nor happiness itself a virtue. Happiness is an indication of virtue.

No one can doubt the intimate relation between happiness and virtue but virtue alone is not enough for happiness. May be in a lesser degree, but happiness does depend upon good results besides good volutions. As Aristotle rightly maintains, happiness necessitates too the external instruments along with virtue. Actually, happiness is an indication of self-realisation. The self realisation is in as much need of external successes and good results it is of virtue.

Virtue and Value. Virtue is intrinsic value. Virtues are needed for the achievement of values. In this way, virtue and value are intimately related but this is no reason for forgetting the difference between value and virtue. Value certainly requires virtue. But values are instrumental too. Virtues are subjective but values are objective also.

VIRTUE AND SOCIETY

Virtue is relative to time and place. Virtues keep on changing according to traditions and customs. Thus virtues are relative to time and space. For example, in medieval Rajasthan emphasis was placed upon virile virtues. Today more emphasis is directed to non-violence, sacrifice, love, etc; or the sublime virtues.

Virtues are relative to a person's status and role. Different people in society occupy different status and they have different roles to concur to the

respective laws. Virtues are relative not only to time and place but they also change with the status and roles of person. In this way, in society different people men, women, young, old, rich, poor, etc., exhibit some difference in qualities, however slight. As with duties of an individual which are determined by his status and role in society so with virtue which also are determined by his status and role in society.

Ethos of People. It should be in keeping with the context of society and virtue to delineate upon the ethos of society. Ethos or conduct includes customs, dogmas, conventions etc. In this way every society has an ethos on the basis of which the life of that society proceeds. This conduct is the morality of the individuals in society. Bradley has been very emphatic on this notion. According to him, an individual's dutifulness is evinced by his concurring with the conduct of society and in it is his morality. An individual's virtues are determined by the laws of society, institutions, ideals, patterns of conduct, dogmas and traditions. All these taken together comprise the ethos of society. Bradley has gone to the extent of saying that it is immoral to propose a moral level above the ethos of society.

But this opinion of Bradley places excessive emphasis upon the social aspect of ethics and virtue. Besides the social aspect, ethics also has an individual aspect which is more important than the social. It is of course correct that every individual should attain the moral level of the ethos of his society, but it would be even better to transcend that level. Secondly, the ethos of society is no permanent notion. It keeps on changing and the moral thinking of individuals is an important addition to its change.

Cardinal Virtues of Plato. Ancient Greek philosophers recognised some cardinal virtues of man. According to Plato, the major cardinal virtues are the following :

1. **Wisdom.** A virtuous person always acts rationally. In other words, rational activity is virtuous. In this way, wisdom is a virtue which assimilates all other virtues. It is the basis of the virtues, and without it virtues are virtually impossible. Wisdom means, acting according to the situation in time and place after understanding them. Plato has included foresight, care, permanence of choice and prudence in wisdom.

2. **Courage.** Courage has a lot of significance in the life of an individual. Courage is needed to protect oneself from the attractions of bad acts in life. Only a courageous person can manage to remain adamant in the face of biggest attractions. A person lacking the ability to say 'no' falters when confronted by these attractions. In this way, courage assimilates valour and fortitude. Valour is the external aspect of courage while fortitude is its internal aspect. Valour is active courage and fortitude is passive courage. Due to valour, an individual proceeds to his objective undeterred by many difficulties. On the basis of fortitude man bears the most acute pains quietly. In this way courage includes perseverance, diligence, decision, faith, hope and belief. A man needs courage of different degrees when placed in different circumstances.

A soldier needs physical courage. A social reformer or religious person finds moral courage more to his liking. Courage is a social quality.

3. Temperance. Temperance is an individual quality. Like courage, it too has much importance in the person's life. Both courage and temperance help to safeguard him against attractions. Temperance means avoiding the attractions of sensuous or intellectual pleasures. A temperate person controls his senses by means of his reason. In this way temperance is self discipline. It is opposed to extremes of any kind. Avoidance of excess everywhere is the fundamental formula of temperance. Temperance is a measure to keep the individual engrossed in endeavours of obtaining his objective. Temperance has both a positive and a negative aspect. The positive aspect consists of unity of purpose or objective and is concentration. Self sacrifice, self restraint, etc; comprise the negative aspect. By means of both these kinds of temperance a person can save the energy from waste and concentrate it in the attainment of his objectives.

4. Justice. Justice is a social virtue which is actually inclusive of all social virtues. It includes love, courtesy, cheerfulness, honesty, fidelity, doing duty, respecting promises, etc. A just person does not put obstacles in another's way. This is a necessary condition in benevolence. Only a just person can be benevolent.

Cardinal virtues are fundamental. The four preceding virtues are fundamental in man's personal and social life. They form the basis of social and individual morality. Plato has no objection to accepting the theory of cardinal virtues in a general form. But it should be remembered here that this classification of virtues was offered by Plato with reference to his own time and place. Thus, it cannot be adopted as it is. Virtues change with time and place, status and roles of people. Thus, these cardinal virtues can be accepted only after they have been transformed and modified according to the influencing factors.

Social and Individual Virtues. A second classification of virtues has been effected in the form of social and individual virtues. Social virtues assist particularly social life and individual virtues are of a similar use in individual life. But this classification is not absolute. It is a relative classification. Roughly, the virtues of individual life are courage, self-control, perseverance, self-respect, temperance, and culture. And similarly the social virtues are justice, benevolence, love, respect, veracity, gaiety, faithfulness, honesty, etc.

Virtues in Indian Ethics. The above classification of virtues specially represents the western viewpoint. From the comparative viewpoint it would be appropriate to introduce here the thought on virtue expressed in Indian ethics. In this respect, the thoughts of Buddha, Mahavira, Gita, Gandhi have been expressed in the foregoing description of their moral theories and consequently only the Yoga opinion shall be presented here. In Yoga philosophy, virtues are classified in the notions of yama and niyama and this notion of virtues has generally been accepted in Indian circle.

YAMA AND NIYAMA

1. **Yama (यम)**. It is the control of body, mind and will. Yamas are five in number.

(a) **Non-violence (अहिंसा)**—meaning abstaining from injuring any living being. It includes the control of mind, speech and action.

(b) **Truth (सत्य)**—meaning being truthful in mind and speech, to retain in the mind just as seen, heard, inferred and to speak it in the same way and behave accordingly.

(c) **Non-stealing (अस्तेय)**—or avoiding taking possession of another's wealth and not stealing it nor entertaining any desire to this effect.

(d) **Celibacy (ब्रह्मचर्य)**—not to entertain engrossment in sense organs, especially sex organs.

(e) **Non-covetousness (अपरिग्रह)**—meaning avoidance of collecting useless things merely due to greed.

2. **Niyama (नियम)**. The second part of yoga is niyama or the obedience to proper conduct. Niyamas, too, are five in number—

(a) **Cleanliness (शौच)**—meaning keeping the external body clean by means of bathing and pure food etc., and keeping the internal mind pure by friendliness, sympathy, indifference etc.

(b) **Contentment (सन्तोष)**—Means satisfaction with whatever can be attained by proper means. Mind cannot be peaceful without contentment.

(c) **Penance (तप)**—means the practice of enduring the extremes of weather and fulfilling difficult duties. The body hereby becomes capable of enduring hardships.

(d) **Self study (स्वाध्याय)**—means a regular study or religious texts.

(e) **Meditation of God (ईश्वर प्रणिधान)**—means contemplating upon God and leaving oneself to Him.

Unity of Virtues. According to Plato, "The virtues are not isolated, but one and whole." Actually all virtues are different aspects of one supreme virtue. Man's ultimate end is self-realisation. This is the supreme objective and the ultimate duty. And the habit of obeying this duty is the supreme virtue, and all virtues are different aspects of this fundamental virtue. Supporting this opinion Green has written, "It is true that the end of all virtues is the same."

Rationalism. Kant's ethical doctrine is called rationalism, moral purism, rigorism, or formalism. It gives us the pure form of morality—the Categorical Imperative, but does not recognize the importance of the matter or content of morality which is supplied by feeling and desire. Kant's point of view is deontological, which regards Duty as the fundamental concept of ethics. It is not teleological, which regards end or purpose as the fundamental concept of ethics. Kant lays stress on the Sense of Duty as a unique moral motive. Rightness and obligation are the central concept of ethics. Goodness and purpose are subordinate to them. Kant assumes that Duty and Self-interest are the only two motives of actions. Therefore all actions which are not motivated by the Sense of Duty are motivated by Self-interest. The Sense of Duty is the only morally good motive. Kant further assumes that if an action is done from inclination or self-interest, then it is done in order to satisfy this inclination. Kant, for the first time, makes deontological concepts central in ethics in an emphatic way. Paton says, "Kant knew, of course, that he was trying to do something which no one had succeeded in doing before—namely, to set forth the first principles of morality apart from all considerations of self-interest."

KANT'S DOCTRINE OF DUTY

Q. 2. Explain Kant's doctrine of duty. ✓ (Delhi Univ.)

Ans. Kant's conception of duty. Kant advocated the principle of "duty for duty's sake." A moral life is an autonomous life. Moral directives are directives issued by practical reason. The aim of life is virtue and not pleasure. According to Kant, good will is the only jewel which shines in its own light. Practical reason itself enforces moral laws upon itself. Emotion has no place in a moral life. Kant holds that it is not moral to help another if one is pained by his sorrow and the help is consequent upon this feeling. The value of actions depends upon their motive, not result. In acting there can be only one proper motivating cause and that is a faith in moral law. Sublime qualities like love, sympathy etc., should be adhered to only as a duty, not due to attachment. There is obligation in duty. Its directive is the ultimate directive. It does not depend upon the desire or aversion of the individual. Other orders do exhibit a cause-effect relation. Cause-effect relation has no bearing whatsoever on moral laws. They are not based on experience and neither does experience validate them. Moral laws are universal. Duty is indispensable in any and every circumstance.

Rights and duties. The word 'duty', like the word 'right', has more than one use both in common speech and in ethics. One of the ways in which we sometimes describe a good action is by saying that it is our duty to do it. The action which it is our duty to do differs from a right action in two ways. (a) It implies that only one action is right for us at the particular moment in question, because if it were equally right to do two alternative actions, we would not be able to say of either of them that it is our duty to do it. (b) It

emphasizes that the action is not merely fitting but that it is obligatory. Dr. Moore expands this second difference by pointing out that duties (in the common use of the word) have the following additional characteristics: (i) Duties are right actions which many people are tempted to avoid doing; (ii) The most prominent good effects of duties are on people other than the doer of the action, hence our temptation to avoid doing them; (iii) They arouse sentiments of moral approval in a way that merely right actions do not.

Duty as obligation. The word 'duty', however, is used in a more specialized way as the correlative to the word 'right'. If a right is a justifiable claim in a community, a duty is the obligation to fulfil that claim. A duty may thus be defined as the obligation of an individual to satisfy a claim made upon him by the community, or some other individual member or members of that community, in the name of the common good.

The Common Good. The child has a right to education, so it is the duty of his parents or of the state generally to provide him with this education. An ordinary contract like the purchase of a railway ticket shows how rights and duties are relative to each other. The railway company has a right to be paid; the traveller has the duty of paying the proper fare; the traveller has the right of being conveyed from one place to another; the railway company has the duty of providing that conveyance. This obvious relation between rights and duties in a contract has given plausibility to the view that all morality depends on a 'social contract' by which individuals agree to perform certain duties because by doing so they acquire certain rights.

Example. People agree, for example, to respect their neighbours' properties in order to secure undisturbed occupation of their own properties. Moralists who have upheld the social contract theory have not considered that at a certain date in history people met and drew up a written statement of rights and duties. To take an analogy from jurisprudence, the social contract is more like the law of a country like England, where much of the law has never been codified that is a matter of custom and precedent, than the criminal law of India which is explicitly laid down in the Indian Penal Code. There is a good deal to be said for this theory as an explanation of some of the rights and duties, which have a clear reference to the social organization in which they occur, and particularly of those moral rights and duties which are maintained by the laws of the state. It certainly does not explain all our moral duties which include the duty to waive our rights in certain circumstances.

Right involves duty. A right may involve a duty in two different ways. (a) If one individual has a right, some other individual or individuals must have the duty of satisfying the claim which is recognized by that right. The child's right to education implies a duty on the part of his parents or of the state to provide him with that education. In some cases, the duty related to a right is not so obvious, because it is largely a negative duty or a duty of abstaining from something. A man's right to the use of his own property implies a duty on the part of his neighbours to refrain from encroaching on

that property. (b) If an individual has a right it is his duty to use that right for the common good of his community. It is, for example, the duty of a child to use his education in such a way that he may become a useful member of society. This is an aspect of rights which is not conspicuous in the laws of a state, and the rights guaranteed by them.

Laws of the country. The laws of a country, both for the sake of preserving the individual's right to freedom, and because too much petty interference with the private lives of people generally leads to bad results, normally imply that in ordinary circumstances the individual has the right to do what he likes with his own, although the trend of present-day legislation in most countries is in the other direction. But in extreme case the law-courts have maintained that the individual's freedom is limited. The will of a man who has left his fortune for such an anti-social purpose as the feeding of rats will not be upheld in court. From the point of view of morality, however, there is general agreement that the fact that a man has a right, which ultimately is a right to use his fellow-citizens as means to his own welfare, does imply that he has a duty to use that right in a way that is either for the benefit of his fellow-citizens, or at least not to their detriment. If he fails to do so he will be using his fellow-men merely as means, and so failing to conform to Kant's second form of the categorical imperative. It is just because of this duty to use a right for the common good that it is sometimes a man's duty to assert that right, and sometimes it is his duty to waive the same right. The deciding factor is his knowing which course of action will in the special circumstances of each case lead to the larger addition to the common good.

The determination of duties. In our last chapter a statement was made of five universal 'rights of man', although it was seen that in each case there are certain conditions in which the right does not hold. It has been the common practice of moralists from the immemorial to make similar statements of universal duties. The best-known example of such a list is that known as the 'Ten Commandments' contained in the law of Moses. The last six of these commandments deal with duties which are distinctively moral, while the first four deal with duties which are primarily religious. Rules of this kind are the rules which the general intuitionist says that men know directly by intuition. Mackenzie dealt with the universal duties under the headings 'respect for life', 'respect for freedom', 'respect for character', 'respect for property', 'respect for social order', 'respect for truth', and 'respect for progress'.

Mackenzie's view. The word 'respect' with which Mackenzie began each statement itself indicates a certain vagueness in the definition of the duty; it seems not to tell a man what he ought to do in each case, but only that he should consider how to do his duty when a question affecting life, freedom, or one of the others, arises. It is evident that there is likely to be conflict among the various types of duty. Respect for social order and respect for progress will certainly clash with one another, and to discover which course

of action will preserve what is best in the established order, and at the same time will lead to something even better in the future, is a matter of the greatest difficulty. The most that can be said for the "Ten Commandments", or any other common-sense statement of universal duties, is that they hold in the vast majority of cases, but there always will be cases where the duty is not clear, especially in cases where two different commandments point to courses of action which are incompatible with each other.

Determination of duties. Two questions with regard to the determination of duties are often confused. There is the question of the universality of a duty, that is, whether it is obligatory on every man in every station to perform that duty. Many people hold that veracity and justice are duties of this kind. There are, however, two interpretations of universality. The medieval moralists made a distinction between commandments which are always obligatory ('obligant semper') and commandments which are obligatory 'for always' ('obligant ad semper'). It is a man's duty always to refrain from stealing, but while it is a man's duty to give to the poor no one can say that it is his duty to be always giving to them; whether he should do so or not in a particular case will depend on circumstances, although the command to be charitable is just as universal as the command to refrain from stealing. Veracity is a duty of the same class; the command is not to be always speaking the truth but to speak the truth when occasion arises; there is no command to call a spade a spade or even by an uglier name, however true it may be, unless it happens to be our duty in the circumstances to speak on the particular issue involved.

Universal Rules. On the whole it is easier to state universal rules about those forms of conduct from which every individual should abstain, like murder, theft, or adultery, and it is no accident that of the six from among them.

Ten Commandments. Ten Commandments which deal with moral matters five are prohibitions in the negative form. "Thou shalt not". There is, however, here a second question, namely, whether the duty can be so expressed in definite words that the cases to which it is applicable will be evident to all, and in this respect prohibitions are in very much the same state as positive commands. There are certain forms of evil, forbidden by the universal prohibitions, such as deliberate murder for the sake of robbery or deliberate unfaithfulness to a loyal partner in marriage, from which it is universally agreed that everybody ought to abstain. But even in the case of these universal prohibitions there is considerable difference of opinion as to what is included in the prohibition. Does murder include killing under extreme provocation, killing in self-defence, the inflicting of capital punishment, killing in war, and the killing of the lower animals? Does theft include the exploitation of labour, the evading of taxes by devices permitted by the law, the gaining of unearned increments, for example by an unforeseen rise in the price of land through its being encroached on by an expanding town or through minerals

being discovered under it? These are questions that have troubled conscientious people, and to state in definite language even in a negative form a universal duty is quite impracticable.

Positive Duties. There are certain positive duties which can be stated as definitely as any negative duty, although they are few. The duty of paying one's debts is an outstanding example. The Ten Commandments enjoin one religious and one moral duty in a positive form, the moral duty being that of respect to one's parents. This is, however, a duty which will not hold under certain conditions. The sooner that a child learns not to honour parents who are constantly engaged in a life of malevolent treachery, the better. It is also a duty which it is very difficult to express in clear terms defining the actions it requires; the duty is certainly very different in the case of a child from what it is in the case of a grown-up man. It is true, however, that in normal cases people have, other things being equal, a duty to respect their parents, and there are other similar duties of general obligation, such as the duty of gratitude for benefits that have been received. So it is not the case that moral rules can give no positive guidance; the duties mentioned in this paragraph are just as universal as the duties of abstaining from murder or theft, although unfortunately they are in most cases equally difficult to express in terms which will give definite guidance in a particular difficult case.

Station of Man. It is however the case that many of the duties of any man depend so much on his particular station or condition that it is impossible to tell him definitely what his duties are apart from a common-sense injunction that he should respect the universal rules, both positive and negative, which are known both by our accepted moral codes and the commands of our own

whatever, such as the obligation to be honest. A duty of imperfect obligation is, on this view, one that is obligatory only under certain conditions; for example, the duty of giving money in charity only holds when there is some individual present who is in some respect in greater need than the charitable person. (c) A closely related way of making this distinction is to hold that while duties of perfect obligation are universally obligatory, duties of imperfect obligation only hold for certain individuals because of their particular station. The duty of being honest is a duty of perfect obligation holding for everybody; the duty of engaging in scientific research is a duty of imperfect obligation incumbent only on people who have certain abilities and a certain amount of education. It is doubtful whether any of these three distinctions has much significance for ethics; and the phrases 'perfect obligation' and 'imperfect obligation' may easily lead one to think that the second class of duties is less obligatory than the first. The obligations of a man to do the duties of his particular station may in many cases be stronger than his obligation to fulfil such duties of perfect obligation as requiring benefits; and often all that we mean by calling an obligation imperfect is that our knowledge of what the obligation is, is imperfect.

Duty and Virtue. Is it possible to do more than one's duty? Are there good actions which cannot be called obligatory, but which add to the moral goodness of the agent? Common opinion makes such a distinction and holds that a man's duty consists of obvious obligations like the performance of his daily work, the care of his family, and common kindness to those around him. If, however, a man does some unexpected or outstanding act of self-sacrifice then this is described as more than his duty; it is often called 'virtue', a special use of a term which has been used in as great a variety of meaning as 'duty' itself. A man who pays his taxes regularly to the government is merely doing his duty; a man who makes a gift of his property to the government is doing more than his duty, and so giving evidence of his 'virtue'. Theologians have made a similar distinction and have called those good actions which are more than duty 'works of supererogation'.

Duties enforced by Law. Sometimes what is meant by this distinction is merely that certain duties are enforced by the laws of one's country and are so properly called duties. A man may do his whole duty so far as it is enjoined by these laws and still be lacking in the distinctively moral virtues, like generosity and gratitude. Again, the term 'duty' may be confined to the duties of perfect obligation in any of the three meanings mentioned in our last section, and the duties of imperfect obligation would then be included under 'virtue'. Again, a man may do those duties which public opinion demands that he should do, and these are labelled his duty, but anything more demanded from him by his own conscience will appear to others as virtue. It has already been remarked that a man who lives conscientiously in a particular station will find in it duties that the ordinary man does not know to exist. The business man in the city is apt to think of the rural squire as an idle fellow who lives a

lazy life in the country, but the good squire finds in his station duties of fostering good agriculture and of administering local affairs which can be very full expression of the good life.

Unprofitable Servants. Ethical theory, however, can admit of no real distinction between duty and virtue. It holds that even those who have risen to the greatest heights of moral excellence can only say: 'We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which was our duty to do.' Such men differ from the ordinary folk who marvel at their 'virtue' in having a deeper insight into what their duty is, and in occupying a station in which larger and wider duties are required. There are certain duties which are duties only for a very limited number of people; only the millionaire has the duty of disposing of large amounts of wealth which are not needed for his personal use. One factor which makes duty different for different people is the different guidance given to each man by his own conscience. If one man sees it clearly to be his duty to pay a certain tax, while another man in the same circumstances sees it equally clearly to be his duty to refuse to pay that tax, we may hold that fuller knowledge would bring them both to the same view, but in the present state of their knowledge it is clear that conscience points to a different duty for each of them. So the man who is said to be doing more than his duty is really the man whose moral insight shows him that he has duties which are not recognized as such by his less conscientious neighbours.

Duties Common and Peculiar. The important distinction is not that between 'duty' and 'virtue', or between duties of perfect and duties of imperfect obligation in two of the meanings of these phrases, but between the duties that are common to all, and the duties that are peculiar to individuals in view of their special station. It is a mistake to think that the former are in some special sense 'duties', and more important than the latter; ethical writers have encouraged this mistake by taking most of their examples from among the universal duties. Many good men may, outwardly at any rate, obey the Ten Commandments or any universal code; like the ruler of the Gospel, they can say: 'All these have I kept from my youth up'. For such good men the real test of goodness comes when the circumstances of their station point out to them some exceptional and outstanding duty; the young man of our example was called upon to sell all that he had and give the proceeds to the poor.

Duty as Moral Obligation. Since section two of this chapter we have been talking of duties as particular obligations, but we must now go back to a use (akin to that mentioned in the first section) in which duty stands for moral obligation generally. We may, for example, undertake a certain journey either because we want to do it, or because it is a necessary means to our fulfilling some purpose that we have in view, or because it is our duty to do so. We saw in an earlier chapter that the motive to an action may be an impulse within us driving us on to the action or an end at which we are aiming, or a sense of duty. This is the meaning of the word 'duty' in Wordsworth's famous ode, and in Bradley's chapter title 'Duty for Duty's

Sake. We may say that Kant held that duty in this meaning is the only motive which gives moral value to an action.

Moral Standard. In this sense, duty is the obligation to conform to the moral standard, whatever it may be. If we hold that the standard is a law, either a law of God or a law of nature, our duty is our obligation to obey that law. If we hold that this standard is the attainment of one or many intrinsically good things for ourselves or for other people, our duty is our obligation to seek these ends. Our study has made it amply clear that it is not easy either to know or to apply these standards, and when people are enjoined to do their duty, all that is usually meant is that they should act according to the immediate intuitions of their consciences. Indeed, all that the moralist can advise for any particular moment of choice is that it is a man's duty to do what his conscience at that moment indicates, although the moralist may add that the individual has an even graver duty of educating his conscience insofar as he has the power to do so.

Classes of People. People vary much in the extent to which their conduct is determined by what they consider to be their duty, their sense of duty in the common phrase. People who are so guided in an outstanding way are said to be conscientious or said to have a strong sense of duty. It is debatable whether this conscientiousness is necessarily a mark of outstanding goodness of character; there are cases where it may indicate rather strong tendencies in the direction of evil which have to be combated and overcome. There is at any rate a very different type of good character from that of the conscientious; there are people who seem to do good almost unconsciously without any feeling of obligation. Wordsworth refers to them as

*'Glad hearts without reproach or blot,
Who do thy work, and know it not.'*

Nobler Character. In many ways this is the nobler type of character. On the other hand many hold with Kant that there is a special moral value in doing an action simply because it is a duty, and not because it appeals to any other motive. It is through such acts of willing what is contrary to a man's own inclinations that a strong character is developed. The sense of duty does have a place in the moral life, but it is not the only motive to good actions. The aim of the good man is to form such habits of doing his duty, including the habit of watching for new opportunities of good action, so that he may do good almost automatically, without a constant reference to the guidance of his own conscience which may even lead him into a bad habit of morbid introspection.

CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

Q. 3. Discuss Kant's Categorical Imperative and distinguish it from hypothetical imperatives. (Delhi Univ.)

Ans. Categorical Imperative of Kant. According to Kant the internal law of conscience or practical reason is the ultimate moral standard. The